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Abstract
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992)
private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct
but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating
the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric
auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively
than the strong and then test bidders’ preference for …rst- vs. second–price
auctions.
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1. Introduction
Like most of the theoretical literature, auction experiments typically assume that
bidders’ valuations or signals are drawn from the same probability distribution
(see the survey by Kagel, 1995). However, this symmetry assumption is violated
in many real-life auction environments, because bidders often know that and how
they di¤er, for example, in the light of earlier experiences or due to collusion
between subsets of otherwise symmetric bidders. The limited relevance of the
symmetric auction framework is aggravated by the fact that many of the cele-
brated results of symmetric auctions, such as the revenue equivalence of a larger
class of auction games, do not extend to asymmetric auctions.
There is a small theoretical literature on asymmetric auctions, which deals with
various kinds of asymmetries: asymmetries between commonly known distribution
functions from which valuations or signals are independently drawn, asymmetries
induced by a known ranking of valuations (which involves a particular stochastic
dependency), and asymmetries between valuation functions while maintaining the
symmetry of the distribution from which private signals are drawn.
Several authors have followed the …rst approach to model bidder asymmetry, and
assumed that bidders’ valuations are independently drawn from di¤erent prob-
ability distributions, which are common knowledge among them. In this spirit,
Vickrey (1961) already considers an auction with two bidders in which the one
bidder’s valuation is known to the other bidder with certainty, and Griesmer et
al.(1967) analyze …rst-price auctions with two bidders whose valuations are uni-
formly distributed over di¤erent supports.
More recently, Plum (1992) analyzes the two bidder case for arbitrary continuous
distributions, and proves that the …rst-price auction has a unique pure strategy
equilibrium with strictly monotone increasing bid functions. In addition, he ex-
plicitly solves the …rst-price auction game for a parametric class of distribution
functions.
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In a similar framework, Maskin and Riley (2000a) explain the properties of several
asymmetric two bidder examples, where a stochastic order stronger than …rst-
order stochastic dominance is assumed, Maskin and Riley (2000b), Reny (1999),
and Simon and Zame (2000) analyze existence of pure strategy equilibria in …rst-
price auctions for the general n bidder case, and Lebrun (1999) proves uniqueness
of pure strategy equilibria in the general n bidder case.1
Asymmetries induced by a known ranking of valuations are analyzed by Lands-
berger et al.(2000). This asymmetry cannot be subsumed under the approach
that assumes that valuations are independently drawn from commonly known
distribution functions. And indeed, it generates distinct results.
Another branch of the literature has also begun to analyze asymmetries between
valuations functions in the a¢liated and (almost) common-value framework, while
maintaining the symmetry of the distribution from which private signals are drawn
(see the example by Bikchandani (1988), and the associated experiment by Avery
and Kagel (1998); see also the example by Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999)).
In the literature there are only a few asymmetric auction experiments. Most of
them concern the common-value case (see the survey by Kagel, 1995). Employ-
ing the private-value framework Pezanis-Christou (1999) tests one variant of the
Maskin and Riley model (2000a) and rejects the predicted revenue ranking.
The present paper reports on a laboratory experiment of bidding behavior in
asymmetric auctions, which assume that valuations are private information and
are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distribution func-
tions. The experiment employs the functional speci…cation used by Plum (1992)
and Kalkofen and Plum (1996) for which explicit equilibrium solutions of bid-
ding strategies are available. We explore whether actual bidding exhibits similar
qualitative properties as the game-theoretic solution. In particular, we ask:
1Incidentally, these proofs of existence employ very di¤erent methods. Maskin and Riley
(2000b) use topological methods developed by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). Plum (1992) and
Lebrun (1999) establish directly that a solution to a suitable set of di¤erential equations exists.
And Reny (1999) employs his concept of “payo¤ secure” games. Finally, Simon and Zame (2000)
view the tie-breaking rule as part of the solution of the game, and show that there is always
some tie–breaking rule for which an equilibrium exists.
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² Does the weak bidder bid more aggressively than the strong bidder?
² Does the …rst–price auction raise more expected revenue for the seller?
² Does the second–price auction generate higher payo¤s to the strong bidder
and the …rst-price auction to the weak bidder?
² Do bidders rank the two auctions accordingly?
² Can deviations from equilibrium strategies be explained by caution or risk
aversion?
In the experiment each subject played either the role of the weak or the strong
bidder, and this for 6 rounds of bidding in a …rst–price auction and another 6
rounds in a second–price auction. The 1st phase consisted of 4 cycles of such
12 bidding rounds. Subjects confronted randomly selected partners in match-
ing groups of 14 participants, namely 7 bidders 1 and 7 bidders 2. Thus each
participant confronted altogether 7 co-bidders in an irregular fashion.
Do both bidders understand which auction yields higher payo¤s, as unambigu-
ously predicted by theory? To explore this question, the second phase of an
experimental session introduces an additional stage. Before learning their private
values participants must determine a price limit for dictating the pricing rule.
The second phase consists of 16 successive such auction games. Due to incentive
compatibility of random pricing (see Becker, De Groot, and Marschak, 1963) and
of random dictatorship our mechanism should induce participants to reveal their
true willingness to pay for choosing the pricing rule.
At the end of the experiment participants play another 16 rounds (third phase)
where they choose their price limits after learning their private values.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical background
and the experimental design are explained in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4 we




We consider a slightly simpli…ed version of Plum (1992). Speci…cally, two risk-
neutral bidders (i = 1; 2) compete for the purchase of a single item in either a …rst–
or a second–price sealed–bid auction. Bidders’ valuations are private information
and independently drawn from uniform distributions with supports [®; ¯1] and
[®; ¯2], with
¯2 = 200 > ¯1 = 150 > ® = 50; (2.1)
as illustrated in Figure 1. Therefore, the random valuation V2 is obtained by
“stretching” the valuation V1. Obviously, V2 is more favorable than V1, in the
strong sense of …rst–order stochastic dominance.




Figure 1: Support of random valuations
Equilibrium bid functions As shown by Plum (1992, pp. 401–403), the …rst–
price sealed–bid auction has the following equilibrium bid functions:




1 + °ic(vi ¡ ®)2







°1 := ¡1; °2 := 1: (2.4)
These are plotted in Figure 2, which shows that the bidder with the more favorable
valuation (bidder 2) bids pointwise less than bidder 1. An immediate implication
is that the …rst-price auction gives rise to ine¢ciency, because the bidder with
the lower valuation wins the auction with positive probability. (For example,
if v2 = 150, the bidder with the lower valuation wins the auction for all V1 in











Figure 2: Equilibrium bid functions in …rst-price sealed-bid auction
Of course, truthful bidding is an equilibrium in dominant strategies in the second–
price sealed–bid auction, and so is the following plausible modi…cation of truthful




vi if vi · ¯1
¯1 if vi 2 [¯1; ¯2]
(2.5)
Bidders’ equilibrium payo¤s Using Plum’s solution of the two auction games,
one can compute bidders’ equilibrium payo¤s, denoted by ui(vi). These are needed
as a benchmark in our experiment.
If the auction is second–price sealed–bid, the computation of usi (vi) is straightfor-







® F1(x)dx if v2 · ¯1R ¯1
® F1(x)dx+ v2 ¡ ¯1 if v2 2 [¯1; ¯2]
(2.7)
If the auction is a …rst–price sealed–bid auction, bidders i’s equilibrium probability


























Therefore, in order to compute ufi (vi), one needs to …nd the inverse Ái(x) of the
equilibrium bid function which is de…ned on bids x, as follows:2
Ái(x) := b
f¡1
i (x) = ®+
2(x¡ ®)
1 ¡ °i(x¡ ®)2c
: (2.10)
Therefore, one obtains:
ufi (vi) := Fj(Áj(b
f
i (vi)))(vi ¡ bfi (vi)) (2.11)
=
vi ¡ bfi (vi)
¯j ¡ ®
Ã
2(bfi (vi) ¡ ®)
1 ¡ °j(bfi (vi) ¡ ®)2c
!
: (2.12)
Bidders’ equilibrium payo¤s are plotted for both auction rules in Figure 3 which il-
lustrates that the strong bidder 2 strictly prefers the second-price auction, whereas
the weak bidder 1 strictly prefers the …rst-price auction:
uf1(v1) > u
s
1(v1) for all v1 2 (®; ¯1] (2.13)
us2(v2) > u
f
















Figure 3: Bidders’ equilibrium payo¤s
2In order to …nd the inverse of equilibrium bid functions, employ the following transformation:
Bi := bi ¡ ®, xi := vi ¡ ®, di :=
p
1 + °icx2i , and one obtains, after a few manipulations,
xi = 2Bi=(1 ¡ °iB2i c).
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These completely opposite rankings are intuitively appealing, and they are con-
sistent with a key result in Maskin and Riley (2000a).
Bidders’ equilibrium payo¤s behind the veil of ignorance From the
ui(vi)’s one can compute bidders’ equilibrium payo¤s behind the veil of ignorance,
i.e., the expected payo¤s determined before valuations are drawn:


















For the assumed values of the parameters ®, ¯i this implies:
Us1 = 11:111 < U
f
1 = 12:295 (2.17)
Us2 = 36:111 > U
f
2 = 32:474. (2.18)
Of course, this ranking is implied by (2.13)-(2.14).
Bidders’ value of dictatorship behind the veil of ignorance In the ex-
periment (2nd phase) we give bidders the chance to select the auction rule, before
they know their valuation. Speci…cally, we let them bid for the right to choose the
favored auction against a random price generator (Becker, De Groot, Marschak,
1963) If the bid is at or above that random price, the bidder must pay the random
price and dictatorially chooses his favored auction rule, otherwise the auctioneer
selects the auction rule by the ‡ip of a fair coin.
Obviously, truthful bidding is the optimal strategy and the value of the right to
choose the auction, which we call value of dictatorship, L, is de…ned as follows:
Li = max
n






(U si + U
f
i ) (2.19)
L1 = 0:592 < 1:8185 = L2: (2.20)
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Of course, if the bidder gains „dictatorship”, he chooses the auction that gives
the higher Ui. As one can see from (2.17)-(2.18), the weak bidder 1 prefers the
…rst-price auction whereas the strong bidder 2 favors the second–price auction. In
view of L2 > L1 the same random price generator applied to bidder 1 and 2 will
less often induce dictatorial rule choices in case of bidder 1.
Value of dictatorship if bidders know their valuation In the experiment
(3rd phase) we also give bidders the chance to select the auction rule after learning
their valuation, i.e., after the veil of ignorance has been removed, again using










(usi (vi) + u
f
i (vi)): (2.21)
However, this ignores some subtle updating and strategic signalling issues. For
example, in the event when the strong bidder 2 fails to dictate the preferred
second-price format, player 1 should update his probability assessment of v2, which
in turn a¤ects the equilibrium strategies of the subsequent …rst-price auction game
and hence the equilibrium payo¤ ufi (vi) in (2.21). Therefore, (2.21) can only serve
as a rough benchmark, if at all.
3. Experimental design
In the experiment we neither excluded over- nor underbidding by letting v1 vary
from 50 to 150 and v2 from 50 to 200 whereas bids bi (vi) could vary from 0
to 250. The random price p of the 2nd (3rd) phase was chosen from the range
0 · p · 30 since the value of the right to dictate the pricing rule should always
be non-negative. Of course, neither vi nor bi (vi) can vary continuously in a
computerized setup. Actually both, vi and bi had to be integers. The two private
values v1 and v2 were independently drawn form a uniform distribution with
support f50; 51; :::; 150g, respectively f50; 51; :::; 200g:.
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A session was subdivided into three phases:
The 1st Phase consisted of 4 cycles of 12 bidding rounds, …rst 6 rounds with
the …rst-price rule, then 6 rounds of the second-price rule. In each round …rst the
private values v1 and v2 were randomly selected. Then the two bidders determined
their bid b1 (v1), respectively b2 (v2).
The 2nd Phase consisted of 16 bidding rounds with endogenous price rule. First
both, bidder i = 1 and bidder i = 2, had to state their price limit li for being
able to dictate the pricing rule (F or S). It was then determined by an unbiased
chance move whether 1 or 2 became the potential dictator. If this was bidder i,
he could dictate the pricing rule F or S whenever the randomly chosen price d of
dictatorship with 0 · d · 30 satis…ed d · li. After choosing F or S the auction
round was played as in the 1st phase.
The 3rd Phase di¤ered from the 2nd phase only by the timing of events.
Here …rst the private values v1 and v2 were randomly selected, i.e., all decisions
(li, F or S, bi) were made knowing one’s private value vi.
The bidders were informed whether or not they have bought, about the price to
be paid by the buyer, their private (reselling) value, their own bid, the bid of the
other bidder, their own payo¤ in the current round, their total pro…t up to this
time and their average pro…t in each auction type. At the end of each auction in
phase 2, respectively 3, the dictator also learned about his costs for choosing the
pricing rule.
Participants were invited to register for the experiment (mainly by distributing
lea‡ets in undergraduate courses of the economics faculty of Humboldt Univer-
sity in Berlin). After entering the computer laboratory participants were seated
at visually separated terminals where they could read the instructions (see Ap-
pendix B). They could privately ask for clari…cations but not for advice. We have
performed 8 sessions, 7 with 14 participants and 1 with 12 participants each (due
to a technical problem only the results of the 1st phase could be saved for one of
the 8 sessions). All sessions lasted about two hours.
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4. Results
In the following, we use the theoretical results of Section 2.2 as a benchmark to
assess the actual bidding behavior in phases 1 and 2. The analysis of phase 3 is
primarily of an exploratory nature since the associated theoretical benchmark is
debatable.
4.1. E¢ciency, prices and bidders’ pro…ts
Despite the assumed asymmetry, the second-price auction is e¢cient, since truth-
ful bidding is an equilibrium in dominant strategies. However, the …rst-price
auction give rise to ine¢ciency, because the bidder with the lower valuation wins





Although there is a slight ine¢ciency of second-price auctions, it is, however,
lower than the one of the …rst-price auction (see Figure A.1 and Table ”Summary
Statistics” in Appendix A).
price rule …rst-price second-price
1 .97 (84%) .98 (88%)
phase 2 .97 (85%) .99 (94%)
3 .98 (87%) .99 (94%)
Table 1: Average degree I of e¢ciency
(in brackets: Percentage of Pareto-e¢cient allocations)
Learning to induce e¢cient allocations is more pronounced in second-price auction
than in …rst-price auction when measured by phases (see Table 1). As shown in
Figure 4 we observe on average a stable increase of e¢ciency in second-price
auctions over time. The greater ine¢ciency of …rst-price auctions results from
the need to coordinate how far one should underbid one’s private value, i.e., how





















Figure 4: Average degree I of e¢ciency over time
Let us assume the perspective of the seller who is interested in a large expected
revenue. Table 2 lists in the top row the expected equilibrium prices p¤ (see
Kalkofen and Plum, 1996) and in the lower rows the average prices of the …rst-
and second-price auction, separately for phase 1, 2, and 3.3 A Binomial test
(p = :004; one-tailed, N = 8, phase 1)4 for all three phases reveals that the
seller’s revenues from …rst-price auctions are higher than those from second-price
auctions (see Table ”Summary Statistics” in Appendix A). The cumulative dis-
tribution function for second-price auction is in all three phases above that one
for …rst-price auction (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A). Note that according to the
realized prices in phases 1 and 2 the incentive of the seller for the …rst-price rule is
substantially larger than indicated by the solution prices for risk-neutral bidders,
i.e., the theoretic solution underestimates the actual advantage of relying on …rst-
rather than on second-price auctions.
price rule …rst-price second-price
normative 90.46 88.89
1 103.87 87.06
phase 2 104.70 90.69
3 98.74 89.97
Table 2: Expected/average prices
3Of course, these benchmark prices can only be used as a rough approximation in the analysis
of phase 3.
4For phases 2 and 3: p = :008 (N = 7):
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According to Table 3 the mean pro…ts for both bidders are higher for the second-
price auction than for the …rst-price auction. Whereas the payo¤s in phases 1 and
2 of the second-price auction are close to their benchmarks in all sessions5, in the
…rst-price auction they are invariantly below their benchmarks (2.17)-(2.18). The
second-price auction generates signi…cantly higher payo¤s to the bidders, both
weak and strong, and in all three phases.6 The possibility to endogenously select
the auction type in the 2nd (3rd) phase leads to no essential earning e¤ects.7
bidder 1 2
price rule …rst-price second-price …rst-price second-price
1 6.37 11.23 22.75 35.36
phase 2 6.65 11.12 21.68 34.42
3 7.35 11.72 22.15 33.83
Table 3: Average bidders’ pro…ts
4.2. Bidding behavior
In Table 4 we compare the average level of under/over-bidding [vi ¡ bi (vi)] =vi
for …rst- and second-price auction as well as for the di¤erent phases and the two
bidders, for vi 2 f50; 51; :::; 150g.
price rule …rst-price second-price
bidder 1 2 1 2
1 .19 .22 -.03 -.02
phase 2 .19 .23 -.04 -.01
3 .20 .24 -.05 -.01
Table 4: Average under/overbidding
5We have con…rmed that the distributions of actually selected values v1 and v2 do not di¤er
signi…cantly from the a priori-distributions.
6One-tailed Binomial test; for phase 1: p = :004 (N = 8); phase 2: p = :008 (N = 7), phase
3: p = :062 (N = 7):
7In phase 2 and 3 this includes, of course, the costs resulting from the random price mecha-
nism, i.e., the earnings from bidding are slightly higher when being able to dictate the auction
type.
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According to Table 4 under/overbidding ratios are rather stable (over phases).
The average tendency in second-price auctions seems to be truthful bidding, i.e.,
bi (vi) = vi for i = 1; 2. Nearly half of all bids in all three phases are equal to
subjects’ reselling values (39% in phase 1, 47% in phase 2, and 48% in phase 3).
Possible reasons for the revealed slight overbidding could be that:
- the dominant strategy is not transparent;
- spite on behalf of bidder 1 (who overbids more often and who might feel
underprivileged);
- sealed-bid procedures mays slow down learning, since they frequently do not
provide the feedback that tends to reduce overbidding.
As to be expected, …rst-price auctions rely on substantial underbidding (see Table
”Summary Statistics” in Appendix A). The mean degree of underbidding in the
range 50 · vi · 150 is signi…cantly larger for bidder 2 than for bidder 1 (p = :035;














































































































































median actual degree of underbidding
vi-b(vi)
vi
Figure 5: Degree of underbidding in …rst-price auction (phase 1)
For …rst-price auction it is interesting to analyze how the degree of underbidding
depends on vi. In Figure 5 the left diagram illustrates the optimal degree of
8For phases 2 and 3 in 5, respectively 6, out of 7 sessions we observe larger underbidding for
bidder 2.
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underbidding [vi ¡ b¤i (vi)] =vi for i = 1; 2 and the right diagram the median actual
(underbidding) results for both bidders in phase 1.9 The equilibrium as well as
the observed bids are computed as the average bids for the respective vi-brackets.
Two qualitative aspects of the left diagram seem to hold also for the right one,
namely the same underbidding degree by bidder 1 and 2 for v1 = v2 = 50 and a
general tendency of bidder 1 to underbid less.
Let us now investigate the curvature of the observed …rst-price bid functions for
both bidder types. To evaluate whether the bid functions were increasing and
convex, concave or linear we estimated the following piecewise linear regression
model:




i (i = 1; 2), with (4.1)
vlow1 =
½
v1 if v1 < 100








v1 ¡ 50 if v1 ¸ 100




v2 ¡ 75 if v2 ¸ 125
50 otherwise
Thus we allow for a kink at v1 = 100, respectively v2 = 125 (the mean values
of vi; i = 1; 2).10 This can provide piecewise-linear approximations of convex or
concave bid functions. Model (4.1) was estimated for each session and each phase
separately, giving us a total of 22 estimated bid functions per bidder’s type. The
…t of these piecewise-linear approximations is reasonable: in 75% (33 out of 44
observed bid functions) the estimated individual bid function explained 70% or
more of the variance (R2 ¸ 0:7).
In all cases the bid functions were strictly increasing, i.e., ±i > 0 and °i > 0
(i = 1; 2). To determine the curvature of the bid functions we computed the
9The corresponding mean degrees of underbidding are similar but, due to outliers, slightly
less regular.
10A slightly simpler formulation of a piecewise–linear regression model may be: bi = ¾i +
¸ivi + ¹iv
high
i with all variables as de…ned above. However, this model is equivalent to model
1, and the latter is better suited to compare ±i and °i below. For instance, if a bid function is
perfectly linear, this results in ±i = °i:
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di¤erence between the two slope coe¢cients ¢i ´ °i ¡ ±i, i = 1; 2: We consider
a bid function as linear if j¢ij · §0:01:11 If ¢i < ¡0:01 (¢i > +0:01); the
respective bid function is classi…ed as concave (convex). Due to these criteria in
all three phases there are no linear bid functions (see Table 5). For both bidders
most of them are concave (except for bidder 1 in phase 3).
curvature concave linear convex
bidder 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 75% 100% 0% 0% 25% 0%
phase 2 57% 71% 0% 0% 43% 23%
3 43% 86% 0% 0% 57% 14%
Table 5: Curvature of the estimated …rst-price bid functions
We also analyze for …rst-price auctions the relative bid deviations from the risk
neutral equilibrium (RNE) bidding strategy b¤i (vi), namely [bi(vi) ¡ b¤i (vi)] =vi for
i = 1; 2 and both phases, 1 and 2. There are no signi…cant di¤erences for both
bidders: For bidder 1 65% of all bids in phase 1 (66% in phase 2) are above
the benchmark, for bidder 2 the share is 67% (respectively 67%). A Binomial
test rejects the null hypothesis of no deviations in favor of the weak overbidding
prediction, i.e., there is a positive relative deviation from RNE (p = :035; one-
tailed, N = 8, phase 1).12
Most bids below the benchmark result from low reselling values, i.e., if vi < 100
(see Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A).13 The share of negative deviations in
phase 1 decreases nearly by half when increasing private values. A Spearman
correlation analysis reveals no clear-cut correlation between the absolute relative
deviations from RNE and the rounds.
11Admittedly, the chosen criterion for linearity is ad hoc. It could have been set less (or more)
restrictively. Even if the criterion for linearity is set less restrictively, e.g. j¢ij · §0:02, i.e.
the prediction area has been doubled compared to the criterion we report here, only one bid
function for bidder 2 in the 2nd phase would be considered as linear.
12For phase 2 in 6 out of 7 sessions the (weak) overbidding prediction is valid.
13The coexistence of negative (mainly for low vi-values) and positive (mainly for high vi-




Table 6 gives the average price limits l1 and l2 for phases 2 and 3 …rst for all
participants, then separately for those who, as actual dictator, have chosen the
…rst- (game F) or the second-price rule (game S). The number in brackets are the
number of observations on which these averages rely. The equilibrium price limits
of risk-neutral bidders behind the veil of ignorance, i.e., before bidders know their
private valuations (see the results in Section 2.2) are
L1 = 0:592 and L2 = 1:8185
In phase 3 where bidders 1 and 2 know their private values v1 and v2, respectively,
the actual and observed price limits should, of course, depend on these values.
2. phase 3. phase
l1 l2 l1 l2
all 4.92 (768) 7.55 (768) 4.10 (768) 7.88 (768)
…rst-price (F) 15.53 (15) 11.67 (15) 10.93 (14) 7.82 (11)
second-price (S) 9.00 (60) 15.87 (89) 13.49 (43) 19.64 (101)
Table 6: Average price limits separately for phase 2/3 and for F/S-dictators14
According to Table 6 in the second phase bidders 2 on average choose higher price
limits (l2) than bidders 1 (l1), as suggested by L1 and L2. We have checked for
phase 2 that bidders 1 and 2 had nearly equal chances to become the random
dictator. Therefore, the observed higher frequency with which bidder 2 dictates
the auction mechanism (104=75) can be attributed to the fact that the higher
average price limit of bidder 2 translates into a higher chance to win against the
random price generator.
14For phase 3 the price limits are (simply) the averages of all price limits li(vi) for all 16
rounds and randomly chosen vi-levels.
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Both bidders reveal considerably higher willingness to pay for dictating the price
rule than predicted by theory (see also Table ”Summary Statistics” in Appendix
A). Remarkable is the fact that for the weak bidders in phase 2 the average price
limit of F-voters exceeds the one of S-voters. Although this is consistent with
the theoretical result that the weak bidder should prefer the …rst-price auction,
it is, however, puzzling that the average price limits are so much higher than the
theoretical predictions.
Also both bidders have predominantly chosen game S which may be due to the
fact that it makes bidding easier. Besides, the second-price auction yielded higher
average pro…ts than the …rst-price auction for 75% of the weak bidders and 88%
of the strong bidders in the …rst phase of the experiment.
bidder 1 2
value vi v1 · 100 v1 > 100 v2 · 125 v2 > 125
…rst-price (F) 50% 50% 45% 55%
second-price (S) 19% 81% 18% 82%
Table 7: Frequency of F/S, chosen in phase 3, depending on the mean value of vi
By Table 7 we can investigate in more detail how choosing the pricing rule during
the 3rd phase depends on whether vi is above its mean value 100, respectively 125,
or not. The large majority of S-voters have private values in the upper vi-range,
while for F-voters the two vi-ranges have (nearly) equal frequencies.
Whereas during phase 2 both price limits, l1 and l2, on average decrease over
time (Figure A.4 in Appendix A), this e¤ect is much weaker for phase 3 (see
Figure A.5 in Appendix A where, for the sake of comparability, we only look at
price limits li (vi) for vi in the 30 width-interval around its mean). This smaller
decline in phase 3 seems to be mainly due to lower starting values l1 and l2. At
the beginning of phase 2 participants were apparently too enthusiastic about the
possibility of dictating the pricing rule.
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For phase 3 we have split up the price limits l1 and l2 into its two, respectively
three 50 width-intervals [50; 100], (100; 150], (150; 200]. The data reveal that
larger values vi trigger on average larger price limits li (see Figures A.6 and A.7 in
Appendix A). As shown by Figures A.8 and A.9 (see Appendix A) for the range
[50; 100], respectively (100; 150] the price limits of bidders 1 and 2 with nearly
equal values are very close. Actually comparing the l1- and l2-distribution for the
two intervals reveals no signi…cant di¤erence.
5. Concluding remarks
Although auctions are a familiar topic in experimental economics, most experi-
ments deal with the case of symmetry. Our experiment studies auctions where
private valuations are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known
distributions, one of which …rst-order stochastically dominates the other. Our
results (phase 1 and 2) support the theoretical prediction that a seller should be
better o¤ choosing the …rst-price than the second-price auction as well as other
qualitative properties of the game-theoretic solution. More speci…cally we observe:
² prices are signi…cantly higher in a …rst-price auction
² in …rst-price auctions the strong bidders bid far less than weak bidders
² in …rst-price auctions, bid functions are nonlinear
² in second-price auctions, bids are close to bidders’ valuations
² strong bidders set, on average, higher price limits
² the weak bidders who opt for the …rst-price auction set, on average, higher
price limits than those who opt for the second-price format.
These results con…rm that the predictive power of the asymmetric auction model
is reasonably good, despite the complexity of the bidding problem. Given the fail-
ure of revenue equivalence in experimental studies of the symmetric independent
private values model, the world of asymmetric auctions seems to be an interesting
and promising area for further research.
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Figure A.1: Cumulative distributions of the observed e¢ciency and prices


































Figure A.2: Relative bid deviation from RNE

































Figure A.3: Relative bid deviation from RNE
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Figure A.5: Time paths of price limits (l1; l2) in phase 3




































































































Figure A.9: Time paths of price limits (l1; l2) for v1; v2 2 (100; 150] in phase 3
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auction type phase All
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
mean efficiency rate f irst price 1 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
2 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 - 0.96 0.97 0.98
3 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.96 - 0.97 0.99 0.99
second price 1 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97
2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 0.98
3 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 0.99
percentage of f irst price 1 84.1% 84.5% 81.0% 85.4% 80.4% 85.1% 87.5% 86.3% 82.7%
pareto opt. allocations 2 85.1% 80.7% 92.9% 84.4% 86.1% - 86.7% 81.4% 85.4%
3 87.2% 84.1% 85.5% 95.9% 79.4% - 83.3% 91.7% 88.0%
second price 1 88.4% 87.5% 86.9% 85.4% 90.5% 89.3% 90.5% 92.9% 83.9%
2 93.5% 92.7% 92.9% 92.2% 93.4% - 95.5% 97.1% 90.6%
3 93.9% 91.2% 96.5% 93.6% 97.4% - 95.3% 93.8% 88.1%
mean price first price 1 103.87 103.80 108.86 101.93 92.80 107.93 106.89 107.84 100.65
2 104.70 103.51 103.79 103.25 95.00 - 108.02 106.47 110.48
3 98.74 98.61 104.27 102.63 77.21 - 100.15 102.21 98.92
second price 1 87.06 83.82 93.65 90.61 70.18 88.68 89.74 89.02 91.29
2 90.69 88.49 95.19 94.23 72.58 - 90.00 94.62 102.13
3 89.97 96.75 92.32 96.19 74.76 - 88.16 92.33 94.26
std. dev. f irst price 1 25.80 27.62 28.52 21.06 22.20 26.35 24.86 23.66 27.04
(mean price) 2 26.52 28.40 23.36 27.98 27.84 - 29.39 23.65 23.62
3 26.25 27.79 24.89 21.57 25.58 - 25.98 24.05 27.48
second price 1 33.79 33.01 29.95 33.67 46.36 30.72 29.35 26.14 32.22
2 33.78 32.75 30.07 29.51 45.16 - 28.80 23.89 33.59
3 32.09 27.87 24.37 27.55 41.09 - 28.17 27.61 35.91
mean under/overbidding first price bidder 1 1 0.19 0.21 0.12 0.18 0.36 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.22
(v-b)/v for v  ∈[50,150] 2 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.51 - 0.06 0.12 0.21
3 0.20 0.27 0.15 0.19 0.38 - 0.13 0.14 0.21
bidder 2 1 0.22 0.25 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.27
2 0.23 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.37 - 0.19 0.13 0.21
3 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.51 - 0.22 0.17 0.25
second price bidder 1 1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 0.20 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.10
2 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 0.14 - -0.05 -0.05 -0.17
3 -0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 0.09 - -0.03 -0.09 -0.16
bidder 2 1 -0.02 0.10 -0.12 0.00 0.09 -0.16 -0.05 -0.05 0.02
2 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 -0.07 0.15 - -0.03 -0.08 0.02
3 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 0.14 - 0.01 -0.04 -0.05
std. dev. f irst price bidder 1 1 0.20 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.27 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.19
(mean und./overbid.) 2 0.27 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.32 - 0.47 0.09 0.18
3 0.17 0.23 0.10 0.12 0.25 - 0.07 0.10 0.18
bidder 2 1 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.12 0.24 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.23
2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 - 0.11 0.11 0.26
3 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.20 - 0.13 0.09 0.26
second price bidder 1 1 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.29 0.12 0.24
2 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.35 - 0.23 0.08 0.32
3 0.23 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.29 - 0.15 0.11 0.33
bidder 2 1 0.31 0.30 0.35 0.21 0.31 0.35 0.23 0.20 0.39
2 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.26 0.40 - 0.15 0.14 0.27
3 0.23 0.13 0.24 0.24 0.31 - 0.11 0.11 0.26
mean price limits bidder 1 2 4.92 8.35 4.67 2.78 3.48 - 7.40 4.15 3.28
3 4.10 4.10 3.08 3.53 6.02 - 5.64 2.97 3.28
bidder 2 2 7.55 7.79 6.79 4.83 11.29 - 4.64 9.89 7.23
3 7.88 8.63 9.51 6.24 9.69 - 7.00 8.69 5.16
median price limits bidder 1 2 2.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 4.00 - 5.00 0.50 1.00
3 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.50 4.00 - 1.00 0.00 0.00
bidder 2 2 5.00 10.00 5.00 3.00 13.50 - 2.00 8.00 5.00
3 4.00 5.00 3.00 1.00 6.00 - 4.50 6.50 0.00
std. dev. bidder 1 2 6.62 8.84 6.20 5.06 3.71 - 8.06 5.71 5.02
(price limits) 3 6.49 5.18 6.07 5.47 7.04 - 8.02 5.03 7.28
bidder 2 2 7.39 6.64 7.41 5.42 8.00 - 5.73 7.40 8.18







Please, read these instructions carefully. They are identical for all participants.
During the experiment you will take part in several auctions. In every auction a
…ctitious commodity is for sale which you can resell to the experimenters. You
are one of two bidders. In each auction there are two bidders, 1 and 2, with
di¤erent value ranges [50; 150] and [50; 200]. Each participant belongs either to
type 1 or to type 2 and keeps his own type during the entire experiment. Both
bidders know for sure the both value ranges. In every auction the private reselling
value v of each bidder is independently drawn from the interval 50 · v1 · 150
for bidder 1 and from the interval 50 · v2 · 200 for bidder 2, respectively, with
every integer number between 50 and 150 for bidder 1 and between 50 and 200
for bidder 2, respectively, being equally likely. Each bidder may place integer bids
in the range from 0 to 250. The bidder with the highest bid buys the commodity
and pays a price according to the pricing rule. Then he sells the commodity to
the experimenter and receives his reselling value. The other bidder does not pay
anything and does not receive anything. If the both bids are equal, the buyer is
chosen randomly (by the ‡ip of a fair coin).
There are two di¤erent types of auction. In …rst-price auction the price is the
highest bid. In second-price auction the price which has to be paid is the second
highest bid. We denote by bw the highest and by b2w the second highest bid.
First-Price Auction:
- Price = highest bid (p = bw)
15This is a translated version of the instructions. For the original instructions (in German),
please contact one of the authors.
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- Bidder with highest bid becomes buyer. He pays p.
- Pro…t of buyer: vw ¡ p
- Pro…t of non-buyer: 0
Second-Price Auction:
- Price = second highest bid (p = b2w)
- Bidder with highest bid becomes buyer. He pays p.
- Pro…t of buyer: vw ¡ p
- Pro…t of non-buyer: 0
In each auction the bidder groups are formed randomly. After you have placed
your bid you are informed whether or not you are the buyer, about the price,
which has to be paid by the buyer, your private reselling value, your own bid,
the bid of the other bidder, how much you have earned in this auction, your total
pro…t up to this time and your average pro…t in each auction type (per auction
type). Altogether, you will play 48 successive auctions, which consist of 4 cycles of
12 bidding rounds. In one cycle each participant plays …rst 6 times the …rst-price
auction and then 6 times the second-price auction.
All values are denoted in a …ctitious currency termed ECU for Experimental
Currency Unit. The exchange rate from ECU to DM is: 100 ECU = DM 1:50.
You receive an initial endowment of DM 10.50 (700 ECU) to cover possible losses.
Any decision you make is anonymous and cannot be related to you personally
by your co-bidders. If you have questions, please, raise your hand. We will then
clarify your problems privately.
Phase 2 and 3:
You now will play another 32 auctions. By the …rst 16 auctions (phase 2) the
bidders can choose the auction type according to the following rules: Both bidders
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submit their price limits stating how much they are willing to pay at most for
the right to choose the price rule, i.e., the auction type. It is determined by
chance who of the two bidders is selected as the potential dictator of the auction
type. If this is bidder i, his price limit pi determines the result as follows: If the
randomly chosen price p of dictatorship exceeds pi, the bidder i does not become
the dictator, and the auction type is randomly chosen (by the ‡ip of a fair coin).
If p · pi, the bidder i has bought the right to dictate the auction type at cost
p and can freely choose between …rst-price and second-price auction. After the
auction type is determined, either by chance or by a dictator, the auction is played
as in the …rst phase. At the end of each auction in this phase the dictator also
gets information about his costs for choosing the auction type. By the rest 16
auctions (phase 3) before you choose the auction type as described above, you are
informed about your private reselling value v.
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